J.M. COETZEE’S HALL OF MIRRORS: ELIZABETH COSTELLO AND THE ANIMAL-POET by Ciferno, Alec
John Carroll University
Carroll Collected
Masters Essays Theses, Essays, and Senior Honors Projects
Spring 2018
J.M. COETZEE’S HALL OF MIRRORS:
ELIZABETH COSTELLO AND THE
ANIMAL-POET
Alec Ciferno
John Carroll University, aciferno16@jcu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://collected.jcu.edu/mastersessays
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Essays, and Senior Honors Projects at Carroll Collected. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Masters Essays by an authorized administrator of Carroll Collected. For more information, please contact connell@jcu.edu.
Recommended Citation






















An Essay Submitted to the 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts & Sciences of 
John Carroll University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 



















In his closing remarks in Book X of the Republic, Socrates proclaims “an 
ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry.” Presumably, Plato’s Socratic 
dialogue has decisively settled the “ancient quarrel” by subverting the merits of 
poetry and elevating the significance of philosophy. For Plato, it is indeed the 
philosophers and not the poets who will carry human civilization into the future. 
While the poets were not in fact banished from the republic, the conflict between 
the two disciplines continues today. But with the shrinking prominence of the 
humanities in the academic sphere, it seems time once again to re-evaluate the 
relationship between philosophy and poetry. A good place to begin would be to re-
envision Plato’s work as staging more than only a logical, philosophic discourse: the 
Platonic dialogue also synchronizes two seemingly opposite genres that clash across 
their pages. In his essay on J.M. Coetzee, Martin Woessner describes the connection 
between poetry and philosophy in Plato’s work: “Plato banished the poets from the 
republic because in creating fictions they muddled the waters of truth itself. But 
Plato told us through fiction. What are the Socratic dialogues if not literary works in 
their own right? Indeed, Socrates may be the most compelling character ever 
created” (226). Plato’s Republic is indeed as much poetic as it is philosophic, as Plato 
creates the narrative within which his characters philosophize. It does not seem that 
a philosophic treatise would have the same resonance his philosophic narrative is 
able to create. Plato constructs his philosophic discourse within a narrative to bring 
life and force to the text, a narrative with a life force that informs the text as much as 
Socrates’s philosophizing.  
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 I begin this paper with Socratic dialogue because it sets the foundation for 
the current poetic dilemma, and by extension, a recurring dilemma in the 
humanities. As the prominence of the humanities in the academic sphere continues 
to shrink, the apparent separation between philosophy and poetry begins to 
dissolve. In no example of literature does one observe the struggle within the 
humanities more clearly than in J.M. Coetzee’s novel Elizabeth Costello, both within 
the text itself and in the surrounding academic discourse concerning the work. 
Elizabeth Costello both reinforces the ancient quarrel and reconciles it 
simultaneously. While Elizabeth Costello engages in philosophical debate with her 
academic contemporaries, she remains a poet, reconciling the conflict that Plato 
wrote of ages ago. Furthermore, by crafting the Costello-character as his own, 
contemporary, version of Socrates, Coetzee sets poetry against the other major 
modes of human understanding and reasoning. Through his novel, poetry stands up 
to philosophy, theology, and science as the chief mode of epistemological and ethical 
exploration.  
 Whereas Plato objected to poetry for its “lies” and imitative form, Coetzee 
seems to thrive within a text that does not adhere to conventional genre 
construction. Poets are not antagonists of the state as Plato argues, but rather, as 
Giovanni Boccaccio asserts, people “of profound understanding, which is hidden in 
their fruit, and of an excellent and highly wrought eloquence, which is evident in the 
bark and leaves” (158). Elizabeth Costello argues Coetzee’s position in the ancient 
debate between philosophers and poets. While Costello’s life exists within the novel, 
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her lectures are not confined to the frame, but rather engage a discourse that is at 
the heart of the debate over the merits of poetry.  
 Although this paper traces the life and debates of a single character, 
Elizabeth Costello, I will also attempt to highlight the various sides to Costello and 
her various voices that inform and contradict the authoritative poet. The 
authoritative stance Costello evokes in her debates with other academics should not 
be mistaken for a monological authority, but rather, as one of the many versions of 
Costello we meet throughout the text. Like Plato, Coetzee does not present his work 
as a monological stance against his opponents, but rather conceals a poetic message 
within a dialogical narrative.  
 Before discussing the internal intricacies of the novel, it may prove beneficial 
to examine the external framework that both informs and engages with Elizabeth 
Costello. Elizabeth Costello does not maintain the traditional framework of a novel: 
Coetzee interweaves various planes of fiction and reality into a layered and complex 
work of metafiction. Coetzee’s project begins, not with the creation of Elizabeth 
Costello, but rather with the Princeton University Tanner Lectures of 1997. 
Addressing the issue of “human values” in the lecture series, Coetzee presents two 
lectures titled “The Philosophers and the Animals” and “The Poets and the Animals.” 
Coetzee’s presentation does not adhere to the traditional conventions of academic 
discourse. Fiction, not argumentation, constitutes the heart of Coetzee’s lecture as 
he blends together two seemingly irreconcilable genres, and sets the foundation for 
his later novel that echoes Plato’s dialogue. While he engages with the Princeton 
audience, it is not with his words, but rather with Costello’s that he relays “his” 
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message, if indeed there is a message embedded in the lecture. Coetzee’s storytelling 
mirrors the fictionalized internal discourse of Elizabeth Costello’s lecture circuit. 
Brian Macaskill describes the interconnectivity between author and character in his 
essay “Fugal Musemathematics Track One, Point Two:” “Coetzee and Costello speak 
to (and listen in on) one and other—and to the philosophers—as if on an old-
fashioned telephone party line” (172). Additional lines are added to the telephone 
play as thinkers, both fictive and real, are invited to respond, both internally and 
externally, to Lives and later to Elizabeth Costello.  
While Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals is widely regarded as a novella, a work 
of fiction, it remains problematic restrictively to confine the work to a single genre: 
Coetzee blends reality and fiction together over the already various courses of 
presentation and publication of this work.1 While the narrative ontology seems self-
evident, The Lives of Animals also includes footnotes and an index in which 
philosophers and poets such as Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Blake, and Joyce are listed 
alongside fictional counterparts such as Thomas O’Hearne, Norma Bernard, and 
Abraham Stern.2 Furthermore, actual works of literature (Swift’s “Modest 
                                                        
1 David Attwell writes that, “the book must in some sense answer to he mystery of its author’s being. 
Coetzee’s writing is a huge existential enterprise, grounded in fictionalized autobiography.” Attwell 
goes on to list Coetzee’s main autobiographical works: Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime (2). In 
responding to Attwell, Brian Macaskill emphasizes that “all writing is autobiographical,” a phrase 
from Coetzee’s Doubling the Point that he continually returns to and emphasizes throughout his 
essay, “Titular Space in J.M. Coetzee’s Summertime.” While Attwell traces the autobiographical 
characteristics of Coetzee’s separate novels, Macaskill illustrates the interconnectivity of Coetzee’s 
writing in the way that “everything that you write, including criticism and fiction, writes you as you 
write it“ (Doubling 121). 
2 Macaskill further describes the paring of real and fictive personas in “Fugal Musemathematics Track 
One, Point Two:” “Lives accommodates the ontologically non-existent who are nevertheless centro-
textually present, and embraces those who could never strictly speaking have been present ‘in the 
flesh’, despite their presence on paper and despite their once having been vital flesh, the dead ones, 
and links itself also to the still living ones who were not there ‘in the flesh’ to hear Coetzee speak” 
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Proposal”) are referenced alongside fictional works (Costello’s The House on Eccles 
Street). This blending of fictive and nonfictive elements represents the sort of 
“intellectual play” Coetzee applies to his fiction. He explains his affinity to 
mathematics and its application to fiction in a 1997 interview: “Mathematics is a 
kind of play, intellectual play. I’ve never been much interested in its applications, in 
the ways in which mathematics can be set to work. Play is, to me, one defining 
characteristic of human beings. I look askance at the word ‘work’” (Coetzee, 
“interview” 83). This intellectual play is at work within The Lives of Animals in the 
ways in which Coetzee layers ostensibly incommensurable genres on top of one 
another. The interplay between fiction and academic discourse becomes even more 
convoluted when one considers the commentary that frames the narrative. Along 
with Amy Gutmann’s editorial introduction, four other academics from various 
disciplines responded to Coetzee’s Tanner Lecture; these “external” responses are 
reproduced within the frame of The Lives of Animals. Among the responses from 
literature, theology, and humanist academics, one stands out particularly. Peter 
Singer—a professor, philosopher, and well known animal rights advocate—mirrors 
Coetzee’s novella by framing his response as a dialogue between two more or less 
fictive characters: Peter and his daughter, Naomi. With their dog, Max, observing, 
the two commence a debate about the form of Coetzee’s presentation and the merit 
of its content. Within his story, Singer alludes to the struggle between reality and 
fiction, reason and emotion, and humans and animals that Coetzee creates in Lives. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(121). Corporeal flesh becomes a central point in Costello’s discussion of the ways in which poets 
inhabit other bodies, both of humans and animals. 
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One section of the Singer dialogue encapsulates many of the thematic characteristics 
of Coetzee’s work. Peter presents a hypothetical situation to Naomi in which Max 
has been euthanized and replaced by another dog. He presents the hypothetical in 
order to argue that an animal life does not hold the same value as a human life, 
concluding that another dog could easily fill Max’s place in the family with little to 
no ethical repercussions. Naomi responds:  
“What are you saying—that we could painlessly kill Max, get another 
puppy to replace him, and everything would be fine? Really, Dad, 
sometimes you let philosophy carry you away. Too much reasoning, 
not enough feeling. That’s a horrible thought.” Naomi is so distressed 
that Max, who has been listening attentively to the conversation, gets 
stiffly up from his rug, goes over to her, and starts consolingly licking 
her bare feet. (88) 
We are presented with a similar dilemma in responding to Singer’s fiction as we are 
to Coetzee’s Lives, and by extension Elizabeth Costello, namely, where do we locate 
the author’s voice within the “dialogue?” Do we equate Singer with Peter, who 
shares his first name and professional vocation? Or do we observe Singer stepping 
back from the narration, allowing the disparate voices to animate each other while 
he subverts his own authorial voice? In his book The Wounded Animal, Stephen 
Mulhall also discusses the interaction between Singer and Coetzee’s separate 
fiction.3 Acknowledging the connection between Singer and his fictional protagonist, 
                                                        
3 Other than their separate authorship, the works share continuity under the same publication in 
Lives. Singer continues Coetzee’s project both in the narrative’s fictive debate and also in the debate 
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Mulhall choses to argue for separation between the author and his fictive persona, 
as the “rational, ethical, and fictional misdeeds” of the fictionalized Peter subvert 
Singer’s intention to respond to Coetzee in an argumentatively coherent manner:  
There is, however, one way of avoiding the attribution of such 
thoughts and intentions to Singer—namely, by hypothesizing that he 
intends us to regard Peter as the author as well as the protagonist of 
this fictional exercise. This would, after all, be one way of 
understanding its ending, in which Naomi precisely encourages her 
father to take up Coetzee’s fictional challenge. (67) 
Mulhall concludes that this interpretation of the text complements and validates 
Coetzee: “Then Singer’s creation of Peter would be seen as his silent disavowal of 
everything that his earlier philosophical work stood for, and hence as a genuinely 
graceful acknowledgment of the superiority of Coetzee’s distinctive marriage of 
thought and feeling in fiction” (68). Mulhall’s understanding of the form, content, 
and authorial stance of Singer’s response reinforces Singer’s narrative as a 
complementary and graceful nod to The Lives of Animals. Instead of engaging Lives 
through an argumentative, logical, and philosophic essay, Singer’s response 
embodies the positive qualities of The Lives of Animals, specifically, the way in 
which, as Mulhall puts it, thought and feeling interact to provide a broader picture. 
Singer, like Coetzee, illustrates the ability of fiction, rather than argumentation, to 
present conflicting perspectives with a concurrent reconciliation. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that encompasses the real and external academic environment. In this sense, Singer builds upon the 
kaleidoscopic framing of Lives.  
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The form of The Lives of Animals and the response it receives from the 
academic community foreshadows the creation and impact of Elizabeth Costello. 
Coetzee’s lecture at Princeton becomes The Lives of Animals, which in turn is 
repurposed as two “Lessons” within his novel, Elizabeth Costello. Additionally, 
versions of Lesson one, two, five, and six were presented at conferences and 
published in journals prior to the publication of Elizabeth Costello.4 Furthermore, 
the enigmatic postscript to the novel also comes from a previous publication. These 
academic lectures come to form the basis of Coetzee’s cumulative novel, as Coetzee 
plays with the continuity between these disparate yet interwoven stories. While 
Elizabeth Costello contains eight “Lessons,” the two Lives chapters constitute the 
center of Coetzee’s work. From the center, Coetzee builds on the issues he raises in 
The Lives of Animals and the cruel treatment of animals becomes the unlikely 
scaffolding for Costello’s lectures on “Realism,” “The Novel in Africa,” and “The 
Problem of Evil,” which culminate in her experience of death and redemption.5 Just 
as the faculty and students at Appleton College are shocked by Costello’s choice to 
lecture on animal rights, so too are Coetzee’s readers surprised to find the heart and 
inspiration for Elizabeth Costello emanating from this evocative topic. The novel’s 
                                                        
4 Coetzee presented a version Lesson one at the Ben Belitt Lecture at Bennington College in 1996; a 
version of Lesson two was presented at Una’s Lecture at the University of California in 1998; in 2002, 
Coetzee presented a version of Lesson six in a Nexus Conference in Tilburg, Holland. Lesson five 
appeared as ‘The Humanities in Africa’ at Siemens Stiftung in Munich, Germany in 2001 (dates, 
locations, and events are cited from The Wounded Animal and “Acknowledgements” in Elizabeth 
Costello).  
5 As I discuss later in this paper, whether or not Costello achieves salvation is left ambiguous. Coetzee 
ends the novel with Costello suffering within a version of purgatory in which paradox thrives. In this 
sense, the “afterlife” constitutes an extension of the intellectual suffering Costello experiences 
throughout the later stages of her life.  
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convoluted form and its disparate, yet interwoven sources, constitutes the sort of 
narrative play that enhances the capabilities of poetry. 
 The novel becomes a kind of debate hall in which the advocates of 
philosophy, science, theology, and poetry battle for power, significance and 
influence. While Costello, by profession, is a proponent of the poetic, her position 
becomes more and more ambivalent as the story progresses towards her death. 
Although the struggle within the humanities constitutes one of the main 
epistemological concerns of the text, the narrative framework contains the solution. 
As the dying humanities battle for survival, the novel in which they debate 
illustrates the continuity between the disciplines. In this sense, the novel, or poetry 
itself, becomes the medium within which these disciplines clash and coalesce 
simultaneously. While the end of Elizabeth Costello’s life is left ambiguous, the work 
of art within which she argues, philosophizes, and creates thrives as a source of 
understanding.  
 Although Costello addresses the proponents of science, philosophy, and 
theology separately, her opponents are aligned by their epistemological dependence 
on reason. Costello addresses the champions of reason on their own grounds 
through her various lectures, but rational thought does not compose the bedrock of 
her message because it remains a restrictive exercise. Instead, Costello advocates for 
understanding that has a poetic origin. Costello begins with the claim that “God is 
reason… the universe is built upon reason” (67), a statement that she will refute 
shortly after with the bold claim that “both reason and seven decades of life 
experience tell me that reason is neither the being of the universe nor the being of 
 
11 
God.” Costello’s rebuttal of reason with reasoning is a claim that is later criticized by 
her daughter-in-law, Norma, but it serves to establish the notion that there are other 
human faculties to understanding. Costello attempts to step outside of reason in 
order to explore other avenues by which we understand the world, the main way 
being through her use of corporeal imagination, which, for Giambattista Vico, 
involved a sublimation of the imagination within a corporeal form.6 The method and 
practice of inhabiting the body of another being through embedded imagination, 
and not logic, becomes the main virtue of poetry for Costello.  
  Costello extends her critique of reason in chapter one to a critique of specific 
modes of “theological, scientific, and philosophical” modes of understanding within 
the Lives section of the novel. Mulhall traces the conflict between poetry and 
theology, science, and philosophy in Costello’s references to Aquinas, Kohler, and 
Nagel. In the Lives chapters, Costello does not go into a detailed discussion of 
Aquinas, but rather uses him as an exemplar of reason and philosophy applied to 
theological concepts. Her true battle with religiosity will not occur until the next 
chapter in her interactions with her sister, Blanche. Costello begins with a 
description of Kohler’s experiments on Sultan, which tests the ape’s problem solving 
capabilities. Costello argues that the practical, scientific experiments restrict 
Sultan’s imaginative faculties. Kohler restrains Sultan from asking, “‘why is he 
                                                        
6 See Vico’s The New Science. The connection between Costello and Vico’s understanding of corporeal 
imagination becomes more evident in the discussion of Costello’s critique of Thomas Nagel which 
occurs later in this paper in discussing the conflict between poetry and philosophy: imaginative 
ignorance versus rational understanding as a way of inhabiting another being. 
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staving me? What have I done? Why has he stopped liking me? Why does he not 
want these crates anymore?’” (72).7 Costello concludes,  
At every turn Sultan is driven to think the less interesting thought. 
From the purity of speculation (Why do men behave like this?) he is 
relentlessly propelled towards lower, practical, instrumental 
reasoning (How does one use this to get that?) [.…] A carefully plotted 
psychological regimen conducts him away from ethics and 
metaphysics towards the humbler reaches of practical reason [….] A 
good man but not a poet. A poet would have made something of the 
moment when the captive chimpanzees lope around the compound in 
a circle. (73-74)  
Costello connects Kohler to Franz Kafka in the way that Sultan, “in a certain sense,” 
is the “prototype” of Kafka’s fictionalized ape, Red Peter—who has been conditioned 
in human behavior and thought (72).8 Under the poet, the ape (Red Peter) is 
liberated, or at least explored in a more interesting way, whereas Sultan is subjected 
to Kohler’s imaginatively subversive experimentation. While Kohler’s experiments 
leave Sultan trapped and intellectually destitute, Kafka’s imaginative experiment 
liberates Red Peter from the confines of his cage and places him in the position to 
consider questions of ontological and epistemological significance. By presenting his 
thought experiment within a fictive framework, Kafka more effectively accesses the 
                                                        
7 Kohler’s experiment involves Sultan’s ability to use crates in order to reach a suspended banana. 
8 See Kafka’s A Report to the Academy.  
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rational faculties to produce a fuller picture of the dilemma of scientific 
experimentation.  
Curiously, Costello’s argument will alter significantly from the way in which 
she addresses Kohler. In addressing Nagel, who does contemplate the metaphysics 
of inhabiting the being of a bat, Costello retracts her use of rationality a step further. 
The transition between the way in which Costello addresses Kohler and Nagel may 
appear as equivocation or fallacy within philosophical discourse, but the fluidity 
between conflicting modes of understanding emphasizes Costello’s poetic ability to 
deconstruct those epistemological modes: metaphysics and ethics are her tools to 
dissemble scientific experimentation, while corporeal imagination becomes the 
method by which she attacks philosophy.  
Costello turns to a discussion of Thomas Nagel’s philosophic question: “‘What 
is it like to be a bat?’” and she summarizes Nagel’s conclusion:  
To imagine spending our nights flying around catching insects in our 
mouths, navigating by sound instead of sight, and our days hanging 
upside down—is not good enough, because all that tells us is what it 
would be like to behave like a bat. Whereas what we really aspire to 
know is what it is like to be a bat, as a bat is a bat; and that we can 
never accomplish because our minds are inadequate to the task—our 
minds are not bats’ minds. (76)  
Costello responds, “‘but this denial that we can know what it is to be anything but 
one of ourselves seems to me tragically restrictive[:] restrictive and restricted.’” At 
this point, Costello establishes the grounds upon which she will abandon reason and 
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traditional thought. The metaphysics by which she addresses Kohler will prove 
inadequate for the question of “what is it like to be a bat?” Instead, Costello 
describes the “sympathetic imagination” as the mechanism by which one may 
inhabit not only a bat, but also all living creatures that share the “‘substrate of life’” 
(76-80). It is by way of the heart and not the mind that Costello enters into the being 
of another creature, as she returns to her analogy of the Holocaust to explain:  
They said, “It is they in those cattle cars rattling past.” They did not 
say, “How would it be if it were I in that cattle car?” They said, “It must 
be the dead who are being burned today, making the air stink and 
falling in ash on my cabbage.” They did not say, “How would it be if I 
were burning?” They did not say, “I am burning, I am falling in ash.” In 
other words, they closed their hearts. The heart is the seat of a faculty, 
sympathy, that allows us to share at times the being of another [.…] 
There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination. (79-80) 
While Costello describes an example of thinking her way into the bodies of other 
persons via the heart, she seems to abandon the way in which we would think our 
way into the being of a bat by the end of her first lecture. Her son picks up on the 
apparent lack of continuity in her talk as he reacts by saying, “A strange ending [.…] 
A strange ending to a strange talk […] ill-gauged, ill-argued. Not her métier, 
argumentation. She should not be here” (80). It is not until her talk on the second 
day, “The Poets and the Animals,” that Costello expounds upon the potential of one 
to think one’s way into the being of another animal via sympathetic imagination.  
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 In her second talk, Costello goes into greater detail regarding a poet’s ability 
to inhabit the body of another animal. She uses Ted Hughes’s work as an example,  
In these poems we know the jaguar not from the way he seems but 
from the way he moves. The body is as the body moves, or as the 
currents of life move within it. The poems ask us to imagine our way 
into that way of moving, to inhabit the body. With Hughes it is a 
matter—I emphasize—not of inhabiting another mind but of 
inhabiting another body. (96) 
Costello’s emphasis on corporeal form seems to reflect Vico’s own understanding of 
the relationship of imaginative and epistemological modes of understanding, or lack 
of understanding, as the body—rather than the mind, or rather than only the 
mind—becomes the means by which the poet enters all things. Vico describes the 
distinction in New Science: 
So that, as rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all things 
by understanding them (homo intelligendo fit omnia), this imaginative 
metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by not understanding 
them (homo non intelligendo fit omnia); and perhaps the latter 
proposition is truer than the former, for when man understands he 
extends his mind and takes in the things, but when he does not 
understand he makes the things out of himself and becomes them by 
transforming himself into them. (320) 
Costello channels this mode of understanding in her discussion of inhabiting the 
bodies of animals. When Vico describes corporeal imagination, he describes a 
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primitive but powerful mode of understanding that eventually develops into 
rational thought, and although the split occurs, poets have the faculties by which to 
access this primitive mode of understanding in which ignorance is a virtue and 
knowledge is subversive and often reductive. Costello expands upon Vico as she 
describes the tradition of poets who emphasize an embodied experience, as 
Hemingway’s depictions of bullfighting become her next example: “‘We can call this 
primitive. It is an attitude that is easy to criticize, to mock. It is deeply masculine, 
masculinist. Its ramifications into politics are to be mistrusted. But when all is said 
and done, there remains something attractive about it at an ethical level’” (97).9 
Later, on the second day of the lecture series, Costello engages in a debate with 
Thomas O’Hearne—a professor of philosophy at Appleton College—in which she, 
again, emphasizes the corporeal connection between animals and human-animals. 
In his third proposition, O’Hearne declares, animals “‘do not understand death as we 
do, or rather, as we fail to do [.…] Thus to equate a butcher who slaughters a chicken 
with an executioner who kills a human being is a grave mistake. The events are not 
comparable’” (109). This is not the first time Costello has been criticized for 
comparing the events of the Holocaust with the slaughter of livestock. Earlier in the 
chapter, Abraham Stern, a poet, writes Costello a letter in which he denounces the 
similitude of Costello’s analogy between killing a human and killing an animal. 
                                                        
9 In his essay, “Emerging from Censorship,” Coetzee also describes his affinity towards primitivism: 
“Artistic creation of a certain kind involves inhabiting and managing and exploiting quite primitive 
parts of the self. This is not a particularly dangerous activity but it is a delicate one, one that may take 
a writer years of preparation till he/she finally gets the codes and the keys and the balances right, 
and can move in and out more or less freely. It is also a very private matter, so private that it almost 
constitutes the definition of privacy: how I am with myself.” 
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Costello does not reply to Stern’s note. She does, however, respond to O’Hearne’s 
“third proposition,” using these words: 
Anyone who says that life matters less to animals than it does to us 
has not held in his hands an animal fighting for its life.10 The whole of 
the being of the animal is thrown into that fight, without reserve [….] 
That is why I urge you to read the poets who return the living, electric 
being to language; and if the poets do not move you, I urge you to 
walk, flank to flank, beside the beast that is prodded down the chute 
to his executioner. (110-111) 
It is not through reasoning that animals come to understand their existence, but 
through an embodied life, and it is through corporeal imagination, not rational 
understanding, that humans are able to enter into the lives of animals and 
sympathize with rather than exploit their being. It is a poetic, not philosophic, 
understanding of animal life that allows one to inhabit the being of an animal and 
provide insight into the likeness between creatures who are made of the same 
“‘living flesh.’”  
Costello uses Aquinas, Kholer, and Nagel as rhetorical representatives of 
their disciplines but her problem with rational modes of understanding continues 
outside of the academic sphere. Costello’s interactions with her family extends the 
conflict into a more intimate sphere as those closest to her challenge her values, 
                                                        
10 In Disgrace, Coetzee’s protagonist, David Lurie, volunteers at an animal shelter where he 
participates in a number of animal executions. His responsibility is to both comfort and physically 
restrain the animal as it is killed. The experience changes David’s apparent apathy at the beginning of 
the novel towards the suffering of animals, as he is so overcome after the days work that he is left 
crying on the side of the road so physically upset that he cannot drive his car. 
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embedding the academic struggle within her personal life. We observe this erosion 
in the emotional conclusions to both the Lives chapters and “The Humanities in 
Africa.” In the first instance, Costello cries as her son, John, holds her and consoles 
her by telling her “‘there, there. It will be over soon’” (115). At the end of the next 
chapter, after Costello’s experience with her sister and their conflicting perspectives 
on the significance of the humanities, Costello is left questioning her own 
convictions in the face of religious salvation. Both instances reinforce how the issues 
presented in her lectures bleed into her personal life and intermittently undermine 
her judgments of poetry.  
While the conflict between poetry and philosophy is played out in the public 
sphere through Costello’s presentation on Nagel and her debate with O’Hearne, a 
struggle between Costello and her daughter-in-law underscores the public debate. 
Costello’s daughter-in-law, Norma, is also a philosopher, specializing in the 
philosophy of the mind, in the same track of epistemology Costello attacks in her 
lectures. The personal tension between the poet and the philosopher is heightened 
by Norma’s inability to acquire a teaching position in Appleton, further reinforcing 
the growing struggle within the humanities professions in the university. Norma 
also serves as a counterbalance to Costello’s lectures and portrays the way in which 
Costello’s argument falls apart, as she finds Costello’s “‘philosophizing rather 
difficult to take’” (91). Responding to Costello’s first lecture, Norma explains the 
paradox of her mother-in-law’s reasoning to her husband, “There is no position 
outside of reason where you can stand and lecture about reason and pass judgment 
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on reason” (93). Michael Deckard and Ralph Palm further explain the predicament 
Coetzee places Costello in:  
her rejection of reason is expressed using the vocabulary of reason 
itself [.…] From the point of view of the literal, rational observer, this 
is absurd. However, if interpreted in Rortian terms, these sorts of 
oppositions (between what Costello holds dear and what she is able to 
express) capture her ambivalence about reason as a final vocabulary. 
She repeatedly and explicitly rejects reason, yet she has difficulty 
escaping its terminology. (342) 
This is precisely the predicament Costello finds herself in: she sees no other 
rhetorical method to deconstruct philosophy without addressing it on its own terms 
whether or not Norma or any other philosopher finds her lecture convincing. The 
reader observes a number of adverse reactions from various characters as well as 
the audience’s ambivalent response. But Costello knows that philosophical 
argument is the wrong medium in which to relay her message. Yet, Costello 
undertakes the seemingly contradictive mission of criticizing reason with reason. 
Even though her conclusion points towards a poetic understanding of humanity’s 
relationship to animals, Costello relays that message through the medium of what is 
perceived by the audience to be a philosophic argument. In taking up this endeavor, 
it seems that the flaws in Costello’s argument serve to reinforce the limits of reason, 
as she directs the audience’s attention towards the poets as the proponents of truth. 
While Costello’s lecture is in the form of argumentation, her lecture lacks all of its 
necessary characteristics, including a well-defined conclusion, as Jennifer Flynn 
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explains, “Costello does not present us with an argument about the proper 
treatment of animals, but asks us to participate in her struggle with the issue. In 
inviting us to think in terms beyond conduct morality, Costello does not give us 
instructions about how exactly she thinks we ought to behave” (324). While Norma 
is correct in her assessment of Costello’s contradictive reasoning, she does not 
realize the larger implications of her mother-in-law’s presentation. The lecture 
proceeds in consort with the ambiguities of literature rather than according to the 
authoritative stance of argumentation.   
In her essay “Coetzee and Alternative Animal Ethics,” Elisa Analtola argues 
that Costello’s refusal to engage the academic community within traditional 
rhetorical discourse stems from an act of heroism, the same heroism that is the 
source of animals refusal to communicate with humans. For Analtola, Costello and 
animals are linked in their heroic silence, and the fact that Costello does “badly in 
theory” is excused by her elevation of poetic understanding (121). While Anatola 
reinforces her argument with references to Lives, a consideration of her points 
within the larger context of Elizabeth Costello complicates the position, as the 
ground upon which poetry operates is repeatedly debased.  
While Aquinas served as a stand-in theological representative in the 
Appleton College lectures, the true conflict between poetry and religion plays out in 
“The Humanities in Africa” chapter, in which Costello visits Zululand to attend an 
honorary ceremony and lecture by her sister, Blanche. Here, we observe a reversal 
from the previous chapters as Blanche, and not Costello, presents the lecture, while 
Costello is relegated to the position of observer. Like her sister, Blanche is 
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unapologetic in her critique of the institution that has given her a stage upon which 
to speak. Blanche begins, “‘We must sometimes be cruel to be kind, so let me begin 
by reminding you that it was not the university that gave birth to what we today call 
the humanities but what, to be more historically accurate, I will henceforth call the 
studia humanitatis or human studies, studies in man and the nature of man, as 
distinct from studia divinitatis, studies pertaining to the divine’” (120). From the 
onset of Blanche’s speech, Coetzee establishes the antagonism between theology 
and the humanities, and, as we come to learn further on in the speech, the 
humanities come to be a substitute for literature. Blanche goes on briefly to explain 
the history of the humanities in textual scholarship, which of course has its origins 
in scriptural scholarship. In this sense, Blanche inverts Costello’s model of the 
humanities, in which theology dominates the other disciplines. In contrast to 
Costello, Blanche, or Sister Bridget as she became known after taking holy orders, is 
of the opinion that the humanities are “‘branches of study that do not, by the 
standards of the ultimate, matter’” (123). In fact, religion, or scriptural studies do 
not fall within the humanities according to Blanche, who deconstructs the 
humanistic system as a home for both poetry and theology alike. She continues, 
“‘The studia humanitatis have taken a long time to die, but now, at the end of the 
second millennium of our era, they are truly on their deathbed [….] it has been 
brought about by the monster enthroned by those very studies as first and 
animating principle of the universe: the monster of reason, mechanical reason.’” 
Like Costello, Blanche shares a similar suspicion of reason that establishes the 
grounds upon which she criticizes academia.  
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Costello finds herself defending her sister’s position during the luncheon 
following the ceremony in which she engages in a debate with Professor Godwin, 
who teaches eighteenth century English literature: “‘The Age of Reason,’” as Costello 
ironically comments. Costello explains her interpretation of the implications of her 
sister’s lecture: “If the humanities want to survive, surely it is those energies and 
that craving for guidance that they must respond to: a craving that is, in the end, a 
quest for salvation” (127). This is not the first instance in which Costello discusses a 
desire for salvation. During the luncheon following the Appleton College lecture, she 
is asked by President Garrard, “‘But your own vegetarianism, Mrs. Costello […] it 
comes out of moral conviction, does it not?’” (88). Costello responds, “‘No, I don’t 
think so [….] It comes out of a desire to save my soul.’” At this stage of her life, 
Costello still believes she can find salvation through poetry. Her belief wavers when 
she reads Paul West’s book later in the novel and observes that the poet, by way of 
the novel, is in this instance complicit in providing evil an avenue by which to enter 
the reader. Still, for both Costello and Blanche, salvation is the shared goal of their 
professions and it is on this plane of consciousness that the two disciplines collide 
when Blanche reveals the true target of her lecture later on in the luncheon:  
I do not need to consult novels […] to know what pettiness, what 
baseness, what cruelty human beings are capable of [….] We are fallen 
creatures. If the study of mankind amounts to no more than picturing 
us our darker potential, I have better things to spend my time on. If on 
the other hand the study of mankind is to be a study in what reborn 
man can be, that is a different story. (128)  
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Costello’s visit with her sister ends when Blanche announces that the humanities, 
and by extension Costello and poetry, backed the wrong Greek. The humanities 
should have channeled “‘Orpheus instead of Apollo. The ecstatic instead of the 
rational. Someone who changes form, changes color [….] Someone who can die but 
then come back’” (145).11 Blanche concludes that her sister is lost and that salvation 
cannot be found within the humanities.  
While Coetzee gives Blanche, and Christianity, the last word on Costello’s trip 
to Africa, Elizabeth gets the final word of the chapter as she sits down to write a 
letter to her sister explaining the significance of the humanities. Costello arouses the 
power of corporeal imagination and poetic sympathy as she retells a time she 
allowed her mother’s colleague to paint her in the nude. Costello emphasizes the 
body as the mode of artistic inspiration: “The humanities teach us humanity. After 
the centuries long Christian night, the humanities give us back our beauty, our 
human beauty. That is what you forgot to say. That is what the Greeks teach us, 
Blanche, the right Greeks. Think about it” (151). Curiously, Costello does not send 
the letter to Blanche. Writing becomes a method of reinforcing her own convictions 
rather than communicating them to her sister, who has already displayed her 
skepticism of novels. Although the letter ends with Costello retelling the idyllic 
scene of human beauty, the actual story continues after Costello has set down her 
pen. Costello revisits her mother’s friend, and in her second visit, the human body 
                                                        
11 Mulhall points out that, “the opposition between Orpheus and Apollo is not exactly Nietzsche’s 
famous opposition between Dionysus and Apollo, but it is close enough to recall the way this dispute 
is articulated in philosophical terms (going right back to Plato), and to suggest that Blanche is in 
effect turning Nietzsche against himself” (198). 
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becomes a source for sexual pleasure instead of artistic inspiration as Costello 
performs fellatio on the dying man. Mulhall explains the muddling of idyllic beauty 
and sexual pleasure in the scene:  
In the end, then, the human, body—call it the spirit’s necessary 
embodiment in flesh and blood—may pose an insuperable problem 
for both Hellenism and Christianity, for humanism and religion alike; 
and if for them, why not for any cultural system of sense-making? 
Perhaps that is the truth about the body: it is both the origin of human 
ways of making sense of things, and that which exceeds any such 
sense-making system. (201) 
There were a number of places where Coetzee could have ended the chapter and 
have avoided an ambivalent ending to a peculiar “Lesson.” But Coetzee’s narrative 
style does not allow for continuity and neat conclusions.   
Costello undergoes a seemingly authoritative crusade against the proponents 
of reason within the religious, philosophic and scientific disciplines, using poetry as 
her champion of truth and understanding through “sympathetic imagination,” but at 
various points throughout the novel Coetzee undermines Costello’s authorial voice. 
Costello has ceased creating works of literature, and instead embarks on the lecture 
circuit as her profession as “poet” has been replaced with the title of “lecturer” or 
“thinker.” Furthermore, just as Costello comes into conflict with other disciplines 
throughout the novel, she also finds that little continuity exists between herself and 
the fellow poets she meets throughout her journey. Emmanuel Egudu, Abraham 
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Stern, and Paul West are all writers with whom she has fundamental disagreements 
with about poetry’s purpose and ethical significance.  
 In “The Novel in Africa” chapter, Costello has been invited to lecture on a 
cruise were she prepares, or recycles, a presentation titled “the future of the novel,” 
in which she presents a seemingly boilerplate representation of the novel:  
The novel is thus an exercise in making the past coherent. Like 
history, it explores the representative contributions of characters and 
circumstance to forming the present. By doing so, the novel suggests 
how we may explore the power of the present to produce the future. 
This is why we have this thing, this institution, this medium called the 
novel. (39) 
Costello presents a straightforward and succinct definition of the novel, avoiding the 
public controversy she enters later, which in turn sets up Egudu’s following lecture. 
Whereas Costello’s lecture understands the novel as a universal medium, Egudu 
approaches the form as a reflection of its regional origin, in this case, the novel in 
Africa. Here we observe Coetzee displacing Costello from the center of the chapter, 
instead using Egudu’s lecture as the chapter’s title. Unlike Costello, Egudu does 
present a controversial understanding of the novel: he argues that the African novel 
is not primarily a written work, but rather based in the oral tradition, it is an “oral 
novel” (45). While Costello’s matter-of-fact lecture did little to stir her audience, 
Egudu’s charismatic presentation of the African novel as a “critique of the Western 
novel” receives a positive response from his listeners. While she is not entirely 
critical of Egudu at first, there is something about the lecture that leaves Costello 
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uncomfortable. This is presumably so because Egudu has just critiqued Costello’s 
own definition of the novel, and as we discover later, Costello does not believe that a 
novel can be primarily an oral genre. Curiously, Egudu’s argument that the “‘African 
novelist can embody these qualities as no one else can because we have not lost 
touch with the body [….] On the page it is inert, only half alive; it wakes up […] from 
deep in the body’” (45), seems very similar to how Costello will use poetry to 
address the lives of animals through sympathetic imagination. While Costello also 
argues that the power of poetry derives from embodiment and inhabiting the being 
of another creature, she takes offense to the way in which Egudu relegates this 
corporeal power solely to African novelists. Costello’s lectures at Appleton could be 
read as her attempt to prove that embodiment is a necessary characteristic of all 
novel writing, not just the novel in Africa 
In the exchange between Egudu and Costello, Coetzee establishes a 
fundamental disagreement between alternate conceptions concerning the nature of 
literature, which is echoed later in the story among Costello and other poets she 
meets. Coetzee seems to undermine Costello’s authority as a proponent of the poetic 
in this early chapter, as he simultaneously establishes Costello’s authoritative voice 
in the Lives chapters. Just as Costello disagrees with Egudu’s understanding of the 
African novel, so too will Abraham Stern take offense to Costello’s connection 
between abattoirs and Nazi death camps. The ethics of poetry come full circle in 
“The Problem of Evil” chapter in which Costello seems to undermine and contradict 
her own poetic ambitions earlier in her career and also the poetic sympathy she 
advocates for in her earlier lectures. In this heated exchange between poets, Coetzee 
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challenges his own protagonist’s authority as a poet. As Costello challenges other 
disciplines for prominence, internal forces simultaneously challenge her within her 
own discipline.   
 In the sixth “Lesson” of the novel, Costello has been invited to give a lecture 
on “The Problem of Evil.” She chooses to focus her talk on Paul West’s book titled 
The Very Rich Hours of Count von Stauffenberg, a book—a book that actually exists, a 
book indeed written and published by Paul West—about Hitler’s failed 
assassination and the subsequent execution of the would-be assassins. The passage 
that Costello focuses on in her presentation includes vivid details of the executions, 
details she deems too “obscene” for depiction and presentation.  Whereas we 
observe Costello’s strong poetic convictions in earlier lectures, we now observe how 
the same convictions become eroded by the ability of poetry to channel not only 
good but also evil. Costello argues that such evil scenes “ought not to be brought into 
light but covered up and hidden for ever in the bowels of the earth. Like what goes 
on in the slaughterhouses of the world, if one wishes to save one’s sanity” (159). 
Costello has come a long way from her Lives lecture in which she was the one who 
shed light on the obscenities in the slaughterhouses. She damns West for doing the 
same with the depraved scene from World War II, the same source she raids in her 
Lives lectures. Costello outlines the moral implication of venturing into the “darker 
territories” (160), thinking that “she is no longer sure that people are always 
improved by what they read [.…] Once upon a time she would have said, All honour 
to a writer who undertakes to follow such a story to its darkest recesses. Now she is 
not sure” (161-163). While Costello is torn between the moral implications of an 
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“obscene” novel, Coetzee still gives evil a stage within his novel. Not only does 
Coetzee describe the obscenities of West’s book, but he also describes, in vivid 
detail, Costello’s rape and assault when she was younger:  
When she resisted, he tried to force her. For a long time, in silence 
panting, she fought him off, pushing scratching. To begin with he took 
it as a game. Then he got tired of that, or his desire tired, turned to 
something else, and began to hit her seriously. He lifted her off the 
bed, punched her breasts, punched her belly, hit her a terrible blow 
with his elbow to the face. When he was bored with hitting her he tore 
up her clothes and tried to set fire to them in the waste-paper basket. 
Stark naked, she crept out and hid in the bathroom on the landing. 
(165) 
Coetzee puts the reader directly in the room with Costello, in both her mind and the 
presence of evil, as the assailant’s demeanor turns from violent playfulness to 
sadistic abuse. Coetzee traces the nuanced change in the attacker’s demeanor: in 
this account, the descriptive energy originates from Coetzee in much the same way 
that West, according to Costello, invests authorial energy in his depiction of the Nazi 
execution: “‘the energy came, in a certain sense, from West himself,’” accuses 
Costello (177). Just as the “‘cellar in which the July 1944 plotters were hanged is one 
such forbidden place,’” so too should the motel room in which Costello was raped 
and beaten remain forbidden. The chapter depicts Costello’s starkest split from the 
potential achievements of poetry and also a definitive separation between Costello 
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as character and Coetzee as author (even if Coetzee himself also sometimes has 
doubts about the morality of fiction).  
 In the later chapters of the novel, Costello becomes less and less sure of the 
principles she presents in her earlier lectures. The poetic conviction she once had 
has been debased by the time of her Paul West lecture. Furthermore, Costello has 
abandoned writing all together: her famous novel, The House on Eccles Street, is a 
distant achievement from the past. The only writing she does is the letter to her 
sister, which she does not send to her in the end. It seems that the authorial poet 
that we meet in the beginning of the story has lost much of her place in the world, 
has lost her sense of the significance of the art form she once believed in. Not only 
has Costello stopped writing, but also she constantly travels, putting on shows for 
her audience. Costello begins her lecture on realism by asking her audience, “‘Am I 
going to pretend I am the ape, torn away from my natural surroundings, forced to 
perform in front of a gathering of critical strangers? I hope not. I am one of you, I am 
not of a different species’” (18). But Costello is not one of “them.” Little continuity 
exists between her and the audiences she addresses. We do not observe Costello in 
her homeland of Australia, and she continues to exhibit characteristics more 
reminiscent of Red Peter than of the poet she claims to be. Mulhall writes of Costello, 
“she (like Kafka and Red Peter) sees herself as a hybrid, as a scapegoat, and above all 
as a wounded animal who touches on that wound every word she speaks” (54). 
Coetzee uses animals as comparisons to Costello’s character throughout the novel in 
which she appears more similar to the caged ape than the authorial poet. The 
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following passage from Coetzee’s essay “Emerging from Censorship” predates 
Elizabeth Costello, but seems to inform the nature of Costello’s character:  
No one believes any longer that the self is the monadic unit described 
by classical rationalism. On the contrary, we picture the self as 
multiple and in many ways divided against itself. We picture it as a 
zoo, for instance, in which all kinds of strange beasts have residence, 
over which the anxious, overworked zookeeper of rationality has 
rather limited control. In this zoo there are few internal bars. At night 
the zookeeper sleeps and some of the beasts roam about (we call this 
dreaming). (par. 11) 
In the novel, Coetzee turns the psychological animal outward, as Costello’s 
animalistic nature becomes figured as her external characteristics. In the opening 
pages her son, John, describes her as “a seal, an old, tired circus seal” (3). Later, John 
compares his mother to a cat, “one of those large cats that pause as they eviscerate 
their victim and, across the torn-open belly, give you a cold yellow stare” (5). Again, 
her son uses animals to describe Costello, “A writer, not a thinker. Writers and 
thinkers: chalk and cheese. No, not chalk and chees: fish and fowl. But what is she, 
the fish or the fowl?” (10). John goes from an analogy in which his mother is a 
passive, captive, performing animal to one in which she is a predator. The 
distinction between the powerful and weak animal becomes convoluted in the third 
analogy in which John can no longer fit his mother into a particular class of animal, 
the “unusual being—a chimera with a body of a philosopher and the head of a poet” 
(Greiger 151). The same question that Costello asks of her animals in the Lives 
 
31 
lectures applies to herself: “‘Where is home, and how do I get there?’” (75). Instead 
of home, Costello ends up in a “purgatory of clichés” by the end of the novel (206). 
She spends the latter part of her life looking for consolation that never comes to her, 
and she is eventually forced to reenact in the afterlife the role she played in the 
novel: “Why not go out and play her part, the part of the traveller cast up in a town 
she is doomed never to leave?” (206). The only place in the novel Costello finds 
consolation occurs on the island with the albatross colony, the only place in the 
novel in which she felt at peace: “So she and the two birds remain, inspecting each 
other. Before the fall, she thinks. This is how it must have been before the fall. I could 
miss the boat, stay here. Ask God to take care of me” (56). But the habitual motion of 
the story interrupts the Edenic scene as Costello is thrown back into circulation: the 
circus seal and not the free albatross. The purgatory Costello finds herself in by the 
end of the novel could not be further from the albatross colony.   
 Indeed, by the story’s end Costello is not the same character we meet at the 
beginning of the novel. But, tracing the linear digression of Costello’s poetic 
authority does not exactly do justice to the nuances of Coetzee’s work. Costello is 
never the authoritative poet she presents in the Lives lectures, but rather a body of 
contradictory ideas exhibiting many voices. Mikhail Bakhtin wrote of the novel, “The 
author participates in the novel (he is omnipresent in it) with almost no direct 
language of his own. The language of the novel is a system of languages that mutually 
and ideologically interanimate each other. It is impossible to describe and analyze it 
as a single unitary language” (239). In his interview with Johanna Scott at Skidmore 
College, Coetzee explained the relationship of Bakhtin’s theorizing to his own 
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writing: “Again, bear in mind that monologue is not necessarily monological, if I 
understand Bakhtin. Nor is dialogue Dialogical. There is a certain kind of monologue 
in which voices are evoked and contested and played with that is part of the 
dialogical” (89). Coetzee’s understanding of Bakhtin perfectly encompasses the 
characteristics of Elizabeth Costello.12 The reader observes many versions of 
Elizabeth Costello throughout the novel: the poet, the academic, the mother, and the 
animal, to name a few.  
 Like Costello’s lectures, Coetzee avoids a definitive conclusion to the life of 
Elizabeth Costello, in the same way that Coetzee does not in the end reveal whether 
or not Costello finds any semblance of home, peace or salvation. The insight that 
poetry provides at the beginning and middle of the novel recedes in the end when 
poetry gives rise to more questions and confusion rather than answers. While the 
content of the novel is ambivalent towards poetic significance, the fact that these 
conflicting ideas are housed within the form of the novel speaks to the significance 
of poetry as a mode of understanding the world. Whereas Elizabeth Costello is left 
questioning the merits of poetry, Coetzee reinforces its significance by simply telling 
the story. Coetzee writes the novel Costello abandons, and the external philosophic 
debate that the text informs continues the work of Elizabeth Costello, as “Elizabeth 
Costello the novel says something that Elizabeth Costello the character cannot” 
(Greiger 343). Whereas Costello illustrates the discontinuity between poetry and 
other disciplines in the humanities, the novel itself displays the ways in which the 
                                                        
12 Both Costello the novel and Costello the character: the novel exhibits many voices and many 




disciplines of the humanities inform each other, as the chaos in the content reveals 
the harmony in form. Poetry becomes the medium in which conflicting perspectives 
can clash and coalesce simultaneously. In this sense, Coetzee takes Plato’s 
antiquated form and applies it to a novel in which the debate between poetry and 
philosophy still exists today, but the novel, rather than the Socratic dialogue, 
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